When Is a Life Estate Not a Life Estate in Colorado by Marsh, Thompson G.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 43 Issue 2 Article 3 
April 2021 
When Is a Life Estate Not a Life Estate in Colorado 
Thompson G. Marsh 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Thompson G. Marsh, When Is a Life Estate Not a Life Estate in Colorado, 43 Denv. L.J. 173 (1966). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
WHEN IS A LIFE ESTATE NOT A
LIFE ESTATE IN COLORADO?
By THOMPSON G. MARSH*
"We fail to get from the briefs in this case, . . . the assistance
to which we are entitled."' With these disturbing words the Colo-
rado Supreme Court began a strange detour from which it may now
be returning. The route can be traced in seven cases.
There are orthodox landmarks in 1922 and 1926; deviation
beginning in 1942 and continuing into 1960; and at least a halt in
1965.
I. Barnard v. Moore.2
An orthodox case on the main route: "I hereby devise ... to
my wife ... for her sole use and enjoyment during her natural life,
my ranch . . ., and after the death of my wife the life estate hereby
. . .devised to her shall cease, and I hereby devise the remainder
over of said land, in fee simple, to my five sons . . . in fee simple.
. . .In the event my wife shall desire to sell said place during her
lifetime, the proceeds shall be at once freed from her life estate
hereinabove devised, and shall be equally divided between my five
sons and Ida V. Pricket. ' '3 (Emphasis added.)
The widow quit-claimed "all the right, title, interest, claim and
demand which the said party of the first part has in and to the ..
premises" to the five sons and Ida V. Prickett.'
The court said:
A .. . question is whether the widow, by her deed... conveyed the
fee or only her life estate. We think only her life estate. . . . A
power to convey creates, in the donee thereof, no right, title or
interest in the premises to be conveyed .... Her only right, title
or interest, then, was an estate for life; therefore she conveyed
nothing more, unless, elsewhere in the deed, it appears that she
intended to exercise the power.
5
No such intention was found. It is obvious that the result of
the case would have been different if the widow had been held to
have had an estate in fee simple absolute.
*Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
1
McLaughlin v. Collins, 109 Colo. 377, 380, 125 P.2d 633, 634 (1942).
271 Colo. 401, 207 Pac. 332 (1922).
3 Abstract of Record and Assignment of Errors, pp. 8-9, Barnard v. Moore, 71 Colo.
401, 207 Pac. 322 (1922).
4Id. at 14-15.
571 Colo. 401, 404, 207 Pac. 332, 333 (1922).
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II. Blatt v. Blatt.6
Another orthodox case on the main route: "I ... devise and
bequeath to my wife . . .all my property . . . so long as she shall
live, and I hereby authorize my ... wife and my executor ... when-
ever in the judgment of my ... wife and executor, they shall deem
it advisable, to sell said real estate .... . (Emphasis added.)
The widow elected to take against the will and was the only
heir. It was held that she took the entire estate; one-half by elec-
tion and the other half as heir. Collateral relatives of the testator
unsuccessfully tried to establish a remainder by implication. Thus
it is clear that the widow would have taken the entire estate by
election and by inheritance whether the will had given her the fee
simple absolute or only a life estate, but the court said, "It seems
to us altogether clear that this will disposed only of a life estate...
by giving it to the widow.... The fee . . .is not devised . . .to any
person .... "'
III. McLaughlin v. Collins.'
The detour begins: "I hereby ... devise.., all ... of my estate
... to my ... wife . . .to be held and enjoyed by her during her
lifetime, Provided However, that she may sell . . . the real estate
for an adequate consideration, but should she die seized .. .of the
real estate ... then it is my wish that said real estate shall descend
to my son Harry ... during his lifetime, without the power of grant
or sale as to the same ..."10 (Emphasis added.)
The widow did sell the real estate, and the proceeds in the
hands of her executor were unsuccessfully claimed by the heirs of
the testator upon the ground that the widow was given only a life
estate and that the remainder to Harry was of real estate only, not
proceeds.
The court held that the proceeds belonged to the widow, and
said,
As to the real estate it is pointed out that she took only a life
estate with power of sale, but that . . . no authority was given to
dispose of the proceeds. Let us see ....
It thus seems clear that the interpretation contended for by
[the heirs of testator] would defeat the intention of [the testator]
in the following particulars: First. It would give to Dan over $1300
which his father certainly intended he should not have. Second. It
679 Colo. 57, 243 Pac. 1099 (1926).
7Id. at -,- 24'3 Pac. at 1100.
879 Colo. 57, 61, 243 Pac. 1099, 1101 (1926).
9 109 Colo. 377, 125 P.2d 633 (1942).
'ld. at 378-79, 125 P.2d at 634.
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would convert the power of sale expressly granted [the widow]
from something to nothing. Third. It would give Harry money
with all the authority over it implied by possession when his father
only intended he should have real estate without right of alienation.
We must therefore affirm this judgment [sustaining the widow's
right to the proceeds] unless forbidden by some positive statute
or some decision which has become a rule of property, hence stare
decisis. No one contends there is such a statute and we think the
authorities binding upon us are to the contrary."
The opinion might have ended there, and if it had, the court
would still have been on the orthodox route. However, having
referred to "the authorities binding upon us," the court proceeds
to discuss them. They turn out to be, surprisingly enough, two cases
from Maine.2 The language from these two cases fits together very
nicely. In the first case, Gregg v. Bailey, the court says, "If ... [the
intent of the testator] is so expressed that it cannot be effectuated
without violating some 'canon of interpretation so firmly established
as to have become a fixed rule of law . . .' it must fail of execution." 3
The second case, Methodist Church v. Fairbanks, quotes a rule, and
says, "This rule has been so frequently laid down by this court [i.e.,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine] that it.. is now recognized
as a 'fixed canon of interpretation.' "
What is this "canon of interpretation"? "A devise without
words of inheritance but coupled with an unqualified power of
disposal, either express or implied, conveys an absolute estate.'"
A mere reading of the rule would lead one to suspect that it was
not being applied to words which expressly created a life estate,
"to be held and enjoyed by her during her lifetime," such as the
Colorado court was considering, but that the "canon of interpre-
tation" was being applied to language which merely omitted the
words of inheritance, "and his heirs," which are usually employed
when the creation of an estate in fee simple is intended. A reading
of the Maine case shows that this was indeed the fact. The language
was, "I . . . devise to my . . . wife . . . and my . . . daughter . . . all
the . . . property . . . to their free use and benefit forever and free
from the interference and control of anyone; but if at the decease
of my wife . . . and my daughter . . . there is any of my property
that I . . . devise . . . to them left . . . it shall be equally
divided .. .6
11 109 Colo. 377, 380-83, 125 P.2d 633, 635-36 (1942).
12 Methodist Church v. Fairbanks, 124 Me. 187, 126 Ati. 823 (1924) ; Gregg v. Bailey,
120 Me. 263, 113 Atl. 397 (1921).
13 120 Me. 263, 266-67, 113 Atd. 397, 398 (1921).





Of course, this devise was held to be an estate in fee simple.
Only the words of inheritance, "to them and their heirs," were
missing.
Colorado Revised Statutes, section 118-1-7, would produce the
same result. The statute provides, "Every estate in lands which
shall be devised to one, although other words heretofore necessary
to transfer an estate of inheritance be not added, shall be deemed
a fee simple estate of inheritance, if a less estate be not limited by
express words, or do not appear to be devised by operation of law."
(Emphasis added.)
If the Colorado court had considered this Colorado statute
which has been unchanged since its adoption in 1867, as "authority
binding upon us," then it might have been impressed by the fact
that in the case before it "a less estate" had been "limited by express
words," the words being, "to be held and enjoyed by her during her
lifetime."
The "binding" quality of the other Maine case, Gregg v.
Bailey, is also obscure. The language was, "to my sister Georgie
... I . . . bequeath four thousand dollars. At her decease same to
go to my sister, Frances . . 7 Held, Georgie took only for her life.
Yet this case is cited by the Colorado court as requiring a decision
that, "to my ... wife to be held and enjoyed by her during her life-
time, Provided However, that ... she may sell ... ," created in the
wife an estate in fee simple.
As a matter of fact the Colorado court was not itself convinced
by these Maine "authorities." After discussing them and concluding
that "the rule would thus convert the bequest into a gift absolute
to Harriet [the wifel," the court in the very next paragraph of its
opinion says, "here Harriet was authorized to and did extinguish
the -remainder." (Emphasis added.) How could there have been
a remainder unless Harriet had had an estate for life?
The court's detour began in an intellectual fog of which it was
aware --"We fail to get from the briefs in this case, ... the
assistance to which we are entitled.''18
IV. Patch v. Patch-Smith.19
A distant view of the main route: "I . . . bequeath to my wife
• ..all of my property .. .and at her death all of the said prop-
erty . . . is to be divided equally between our . . . children. I wish
to make it plain that my wife ... is to have all of my property ...
17 120 Me. 263, 265, 113 At. 397, 398 (1921).
18 McLaughlin v. Collins, 109 Colo. 377, 380, 125 P.2d 633, 634 (1942).
19 113 Colo. 186, 155 P.2d 765 (1945).
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to do with as she pleases, she can sell or trade any part of it but
what is left at her death is to be divided as specified above."" The
land was in Kansas. In a proceeding to construe the will the court
said,
Counsel for plaintiffs in error cite . . our recent opinion in
McLaughlin v. Collins .. . in support of their contention that the
will should be construed so as to give an estate in fee to the
widow....
Counsel for defendant in error . . . raise the . . . point that
... the property involved is real estate... in Kansas.
• . . the law governing the interpretation of the will here in-
volved is the law.. . of Kansas.
... Kansas decisions ... announcing the law both at the time
the will was executed in 1936 and as of the time it was admitted
to probate, would clearly support the construction which would
award a life estate to the widow and the remainder to the two
daughters.21
V. Davey v. Weber.'
The detour continues, and acquires a name. "To my wife . . .
I give . . . the residue of my estate. . . for and during her natural
life, granting unto my . . . wife the privilege of disposing of any
part thereof at any time she may deem it necessary for her welfare
and if at the death of my said wife there shall be any of my estate
remaining it shall go to the following named brothers.....
(Emphasis added.)
In an action to quiet title the court held for the widow's
devisees and against the named remaindermen, and said, "counsel
. . . attempt to distinguish the McLaughlin case [from the case at
bar], but we are not persuaded that there is any difference so far
as the Colorado rule is concerned.
"An unqualified power given a life tenant to dispose of prop-
erty devised by will enlarges the life estate to a fee simple title.
Such is the Colorado rule."2 4 (Emphasis added.)
As if in confirmation, the court quotes the quite different rule
from Methodist Church v. Fairbanks, "A devise without words of
inheritance, but coupled with an unqualified power of disposal,
either express or implied, conveys an absolute estate.' ' The fog
continues. Colorado Revised Statutes, section 118-1-7 is not yet
visible.
201d. at 187, 155 P.2d at 765.
211d. at 188-91, 155 P.2d at 766-67.
22 133 Colo. 365, 295 P.2d 688 (1956).
2 1d. at 366, 295 P.2d at 688-89.
24 Id. at 368, 295 P.2d at 689.
25 124 Me. 187, 188, 126 Atd. 823, 824 (1924).
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VI. Zell v. Zell."6
Fog continues to blanket the "Colorado" detour. "I give ...
all the ... residue .. . of my estate ... unto my wife, for and during
her natural life, with the full right and authority to sell . . . any
portion or the whole.., if she in her sole discretion determines that
she is . . . in need thereof .. .and in the event that she shall die
before she has so disposed of this bequest, then I give . . . such
remaining portion to .... . (Emphasis added.)
In a proceeding for construction of the will, the court held that
the wife was vested with an absolute fee simple estate and said:
Since the decision in McLaughlin v. Collins ... Colorado has fol-
lowed what is termed the minority rule in interpreting such testa-
ments of remainders. Our re-affirmance of this rule appears in
Davey v. Weber ... wherein it was stated: "An unqualified power
given a live tenant to dispose of property devised by will enlarges
the life estate to a fee simple. Such is the Colorado rule."28
The court is no longer looking for road signs, and doesn't see
Colorado Revised Statute, section 118-1-7.
VII. First Nat'l Bank v. People.'
The detour is no longer proudly called the "Colorado rule"
but is renamed the "McLaughlin rule." The majority calls a halt.
The dissenter says it is a turning back. The will created a trust and
provided, "My trustees shall pay all of the net income ...to my
wife ...as long as she shall live. . . .In addition .. .my trustees
shall pay to my wife such sums from principal as she may from time
to time request in writing. It is my intention that no limitation be
placed on my wife as to either the amount of or reasons for such
invasion of principal. . . . I hereby grant to my wife alone and in
all events, the power to appoint by her will . . . the entire balance
of principal and undistributed income, if any, . . . free of this trust,
to her estate or to any other persons .... In the event . . . that my
wife shall fail to exercise the power of appointment hereinabout
conferred upon her, then ..... 30 (Emphasis added.)
In a proceeding involving the assessment of the Colorado
inheritance tax, the court held that the wife did not take a fee
simple, but only a life estate, and said,
The commissioner relies upon three decisions of this court, namely,
26 142 Colo. 343, 351 P.2d 272 (1960).
27 Id. at 344, 351 P.2d at 273.
2Id. at 344-45, 351 P.2d at 275, citing Davey v. Weber, 133 Colo. 365, 368, 295 P.2d
688, 689.
29405 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1965).
30 id. at 731.
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McLaughlin v. Collins, Davey v. Weber, and Zell v. Zell. The rule
announced in these cases may be stated as follows:
An unqualified power given a life tenant to dispose of property
devised by will enlarges the life estate to a fee simple title.
Colorado would seem to stand alone in following the "McLaughlin
Rule." The three Colorado cases supporting it have a number of
similar factual backgrounds, viz:
( 1 ) They all involved a direct devise of real property.
(2) They all involved disputes between a widow and contingent
remaindermen.
(3) They all resulted in giving full effect to the intent of the testa-
tor as gathered from the will as a whole.
(4) They all involved a legal life estate created by express language
of the will.
(5) None of them involved assets specifically made the corpus of
trust.
(6) None of them involved any question arising under the statute
authorizing collection of inheritance and successor taxes.
Under the factual situation disclosed by the record in the instant
case, we hold that the trial court erred in applying the "McLaughlin
rule." It should not be extended to include trust assets of the kind
involved in this case.31
The court does not say how many of the six enumerated "factual
backgrounds" must be present in order to justify the application
of the "McLaughlin rule" (formerly the "Colorado rule").
There are, no doubt, several interesting combinations, for
example, (2) and (6). Taken together they seem to mean that the
widow always wins: against remaindermen she has an estate in fee
simple; against the Inheritance Tax Commissioner she has but a
life estate. If it should happen that the same will should be liti-
gated on both points in separate cases, neither decision would be
res judicata as to the other.
The six "similar factual backgrounds" look like pellets from
a pleader's shotgun, and that is what they are. 2 There is, therefore,
the possibility that they may be stated in a manner that may be
overly-persuasive.
(1) "They all involved a direct devise of real property." True,
and they all involved a direct bequest of personal property. The
will in McLaughli# v. Collins said: "I hereby ... devise ... all...
of my estate . ..both real and personal . . . to my wife . . . to be
held and enjoyed by her during her life time, provided however,
that all personal property... may be ... sold or disposed of as she
may wish....,, (Emphasis added.)
31 Id. at 732-33.
32 Brief for Plaintiffs in Error, p. 20, 405 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1965).
33 109 Colo. 377, 378-79, 125 P.2d 633, 634 (1942).
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The will in Davey v. Weber said, "To my wife, I... bequeath
the residue of my estate, both real and personal ... for and during
her natural life, granting unto my ... wife the privilege of dispos-
ing of any part thereof at any time she may deem it necessary for
her welfare."34 (Emphasis added.)
The will in Zell v. Zell said, "I . . . bequeath all the residue
... of my estate, real, personal, and mixed ... unto my ... wife,
for and during her natural life, with the full right and authority
to sell . . . any portion or the whole of this bequest . . .. " (Empha-
sis added.)
(2) "They all involved disputes between a widow and con-
tingent remaindermen." Not quite true, and certainly misleading.
In McLaughlin v. Collins, the widow had sold the land and the
proceeds in the hands of her executor were claimed by those who
would have been reversioners if she had had only a life estate. How-
ever, the court's first ground for decision was that even though her
estate was a life estate, she was empowered to deal with real estate
and its proceeds as she pleased unless restricted by the phrase "for
an adequate consideration," and the court found no such restriction. 8
(3) "They all resulted in giving full effect to the intent of the
testator as gathered from the will as a whole." This statement is true
only of the first ground of the decision in McLaughlin v. Collins.
As to the second ground, "authorities binding upon us," the court
said, in this part of the opinion, "If we assume that the words, 'dur-
ing her life' and 'for an adequate consideration' evidenced Mc-
Laughlin's intent that . . . any proceeds . . . should go to Harry,
the foregoing rule defeats that intent and confirms Harriet's abso-
lute title to said proceeds."3 (Emphasis added.) The "foregoing
rule" was, "A devise without words of inheritance, but coupled
with an unqualified power of disposal, either express or implied,
conveys an absolute estate." 8
Davey v. Weber does not purport to look for the intention of
the testator, who had said, "to my wife . . . for and during her
natural life," but simply the said case was like that of McLaughlin
v. Collins and applied the "Colorado rule." 9
Zell v. Zell simply says, "The wording... is in fact no differ-
34 133 Colo. 365, 366, 295 P.2d 688, 688-89 (1956).
35 142 Colo. 343, 344, 351 P.2d 272, 273 (1960).
36 109 Colo. 380-81, 125 P.2d 635. ". . Harriet was authorized to and did extinguish
the rem inder." Id. at 384, 125 P.2d at 636.
37 109 Colo. 377, 383, 125 P.2d 633, 636 (1942).
38Ibid.
39 133 Colo. 365, 368, 295 P.2d 688, 688-89 (1956).
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ent from that in McLaughlin," and applies the "Colorado Rule."40
There is no attempt to ascertain the intention of the testator who
has said, "unto my... wife for and during her natural life."
(4) "They all involved a legal life estate created by express
language of the will." True, but this statement seems to fall some-
what short of justifying the court's misapplication of the rule from
Maine. Is it intended to suggest that a legal life estate created by
implication would be more likely held to be a life estate than one
created by express words?
(5) "None of them involved assets specifically made the corpus
of a trust." True. The idea seems to be that a life estate plus a
power to sell can be created only upon payment of a fee -to a
trustee.
(6) "None of them involved any question arising under the
statute authorizing collection of inheritance and successor taxes."
True, and intriguing. The thought seems to be that by devising
to one's wife for life with a power to sell, she may be given a fee
simple absolute, but that it will be taxed only as a life estate. This
really sounds too good to be true.
One is inclined to agree with the dissenter, who failed to find
in these six "similar factual backgrounds" any sufficient reason for
distinguishing McLaughlin v. Collins.
If the court has turned around and does wish to regain the
main road, Colorado Revised Statutes, section 118-1-7, which has
never been called to its attention, points in the right direction.
Barnard v. Moore and Blatt v. Blatt lend a feeling of familiarity
to the main road. One might even hope to enjoy seeing the tech-
nique of the next-to-the-last paragraph of McLaughlin v. Collins
used to destroy the "McLaughlin rule."
In that paragraph the court escaped the rule expressed in Blatt
v. Blatt by saying, ". . . a careful examination of the Blatt case will
demonstrate that the holding there was dictum, since in that case
there were neither children nor descendants of children. Mrs. Blatt
would have taken the whole had there been no will."41 Thus by
supplying an alternative ground for decision, the court disparaged
the expressed ground as dictum. How much easier to do the same
thing to the "McLaughlin rule," where the alternative ground is
expressed as a principal reason for the decision, and the "rule" is
employed only, "If we assume. .. "
40 142 Colo. 343, 345, 351 P.2d 272, 273-74 (1960).
41 109 Colo. 377, 384, 125 P.2d 633, 636 (1942).
42 Id. at 383, 125 P.2d at 636.
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If it be suggested that lawyers have come to rely upon the
McLaughlin rule, one wonders just how many lawyers, with Colo-
rado Revised Statutes, section 118-1-7 in mind, and wishing to
create an estate in fee simple absolute, have begun by saying, "to my
wife for and during her natural life."
If it be suggested that security of title requires persistence of
any rule for the sake of certainty, what certainty can there be,
without a return to the main road, after the opinion in First Nat'l
Bank v. People?
